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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DONALD LEON MALMROSE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17661 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction and denial of a 
new trial in the District Court, Second Judicial District, 
Honorable Calvin Gould presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of Forcible Sexual 
Abuse in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-404, and was sen-
tenced to the Utah State Prison. 
was denied. 
His motion for a new trial 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction and 
denial of the request for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 16, 1980, Brooke Williams was sexually 
assaulted while jogging on a running course at Weber State 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
College (T. 49, 55, 63). She reported the assault to police 
and gave them a description (T. 73, 74). She was shown some 
pictures and she picked out four of them that were possible 
assailants (T. 115, 116). These pictures were returned to the 
files without a record being kept (T. 118, 119). On July 1, 
1980, she was shown seven drivers license photos (T. 130). 
She picked out two possibilities and asked for a more recent 
photograph of one (T. 82, 83, 130, 131). Two days later she 
was shown a more recent photograph of the one (defendant) from 
a school yearbook (T. 131, 132). She identified the defendant 
after seeing the more recent photograph (T. 132, 133). She 
was later informed that defendant had been arrested previously 
on other sex offenses (T. 688). She later identified defend-
ant at a lineup. That lineup was suppressed because no 
recording had been made ( T. 695, 707). After three days of 
trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty (T~ 552). The 
defendant was later sentenced to the Utah State Prison. A 
motion for a new trial was subsequently denied by Judge Gould 
and the defendant filed this appeal (R. 639, 640). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REP-
RESENTATION BY COUNSEL. 
The standard to be applied in determining whether a 
criminal defendant is afforded his constitutional right to 
- 2 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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effective assistance of counsel was enunciated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976): 
. This court has previously held the 
right of the accused to have counsel is not 
satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appear-
ance in the record by an attorney who man-
ifests no real concern about the interests of 
the accused. He is entitled to the assistance 
of a competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the accused and present such 
defenses as are available under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the profession. 
554 P.2d 203, 204. This standard has been repeated in State 
v. Heaps, Utah Case No. 16264, October 31, 1979, at page 3 of 
the opinion; in State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918, 920, n.5 
(1979); and in State v. Ambrose, Utah Case No. 16148, February 
7, 1980 at page 3 of the opinion. 
The court also established in McNicol, supra, that: 
A defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the inadequacy or ineffectiveness 
of counsel, and proof of such must be a demon-
strable reality and not a speculative matter. 
55~ P.2d 203, 204. Accord, State v. Forsyth, Utah, 560 P.2d 
337 (1977). Respondent submits that the petitioners have not 
satisfied this burden, as will appear, infra. 
T-"'o other general rules are relevant to the inquiry 
about effectiveness of trial counsel. First, as established 
in State v. McNicol, supra, it is widely recognized that 
courts will not, with the benefit of hindsight, second-guess 
an attorney's "legitimate exercise of judgment, as to trial 
tactics or strategy." McNicol, supra, 554 P.2d at 205. 
Second, in the case of Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 
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P.2d 241 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that in 
deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel whether 
better representation might have had some effect on the ~ 
of the trial is important. If such a probable different 
result does not appear, there is no prej ud ic ial error war-
ranting reversal of the conviction. To the same effect is 
Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343 ( 1970) and 
State v. Forsyth, Utah, 560 P.2d 337 (1977). The following 
language from State v. Gray, supra, illustrates that a dif-
ferent result is still a vital consideration: 
There is the further proposition to be 
considered: that even if his (Gray's) counsel 
did not perform as skillfully as the now 
convicted defendant might have desired, his 
guilt was so clearly evident that even in the 
absence of any misjudgment of counsel, we do 
not believe there is any likelihood that there 
would have been a different result, wherefore, 
there should be no reversal of the conviction. 
601 P.2d 918, 920 (emphasis added). See also United States v. 
Coupey, 603 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Also relevant to this case is the rule announced in 
Heinlin v. Smith, Utah, 542 P.2d 1081 (1975) that the failure 
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile 
if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance. This 
was also cited in State v. Ambrose, supra, decided this year. 
See also People v. Jones, 158 Cal.Rptr. 415 (Cal. App. 1979). 
In Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980), the 
Tenth Circuit stated its view of the constitutional test: 
"The Sixth Amendment demands that defense counsel exercise the 
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skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent 
defense attorney." 613 F. 2d at 2 7 8. This court has not yet 
adopted the "reasonably competent assistance of counsel" test. 
In order to prevail with this argument, defendant 
must: (1) establish proof of the ineffectiveness of counsel; 
( 2) show that such ineffectiveness was due to the inadequacy 
of counsel and not a result of trial strategy; (3) demonstrate 
that better representation might have had some effect on the 
result of the trial; and (4) prove that motions and objections 
which were not made would not have been futile if raised. 
First, appellant has failed to establish proof of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel. In Point I of his Argument, there 
is no delineation of what errors were committed by counsel. 
Only by examining other parts of the brief can we find an 
indication of the errors alleged. These appear to include 
inadequate voir dire by defense counsel (Point III), a pre-
judicial statement about defendant by defense counsel (Point 
IV), and the failure to introduce defendant's polygraph test 
(Point XIII). 
If these are the instances of ineffective assistance 
relied upon, appellant has still failed to demonstrate the 
error or harm of these actions. There has been no showing 
that the supposed inadequate voir dire resulted in a biased or 
prejudicial jury, or that the statement was indeed prej-
udicial rather than serving some other purpose, or that 
failure to introduce the polygraph results damaged defendant's 
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position. Thse instances cited were tactical decisions made 
by defense counsel and are not evidence of incompetence. 
Second, even if these instances were error, there has 
been no showing that the ineffectiveness was a result of 
inadequacy of counsel rather than a trial strategy which 
failed to work. An attorney is not incompetent merely because 
his efforts fail to convince a jury. 
It is recognized that counsel has substantial latitude 
in selecting trial strategy. State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 
69 (1978). This latitude should not be destroyed by allowing 
a defendant to appeal by asserting that a different strategy 
should have been chosen. Appellant has not demonstrated that 
there was no trial strategy involved in these acts or that no 
one would have adopted such a trial strategy. Without such a 
showing by appellant, such actions would pro- perly be seen as 
part of the defense counsel's trial strategy. 
That these acts were part of the trial strategy may be 
shown from the record. Considering voir dire in its entirety, 
evidently defense counsel was satisfied that the jury members 
had been properly examined. The statement, alleged to be 
prejudicial, was made in an attempt to demonstrate that the 
defendant was in jail as a product of circumstances, not as a 
result of guilt. The decision to not introduce the polygraph 
results was also a tactical choice. Defense counsel secured 
the polygraph test for his client and then decided not to use 
it because to do so would allow the prosecution to introduce 
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the results of its polygraph examination. Both polygraph 
tests were suppressed at trial (Supp. Hearing 43). 
The issue of trial tactics is a concern of defendant 
and his counsel, not of the court. State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 
257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969). Since such tactics are within the 
discretion of trial counsel, the defendant is not denied the 
effective assistance of counsel just because another attorney 
might have acted differently. 
Third, appellant has failed to sustain his burden of 
showing that the result of the trial might have been differ-
ent. Absent this showing, no claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel can be sustained. State v. Gray, supra, Appellant 
did not demonstrate any instances where there were indications 
that, absent these actions, the jury might have decided dif-
ferently or might have given more weight to some aspect. The 
record is void of any indication that absent these alleged 
errors, there might have been a different result. 
Even if these isolated actions by defense counsel had 
been error or tactical choices that did not work out, it would 
not preclude his assistance from being effective. Mistakes do 
not constitute grounds for appeal unless they prejudice 
defendant's case. The record contains no indication that the 
jury was influenced by any of these instances. 
Fourth, appellant also appears to complain of defense 
counsel's failure to object to evidence and instructions 
(Points VII, IX, x and XII), but they are not specifically 
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alleged as instances of error. Again, the appellant has 
failed to establish that if this failure were error, the 
motions would not have been futile if made. Heinlin v. Smith, 
supra. 
An examination of the record discloses that defense 
counsel certainly met the required standard of giving reason-
ably effective assistance. He was active and involved in the 
case conducting vigorous cross-examination, calling witnesses, 
and pursuing all aspects of the case. After the trial, Judge 
Gould concluded that "defendant had the effective assistance 
of counsel" (R. 639). The record does not support any other 
conclusion. There is no indication of any harm, bias, or 
prejudice as a result of defense counsel's work. 
Appellant has failed to establish any of the necessary 
elements to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Examina-
tion of each allegation will demonstrate thqt they are 
unfounded. 
In light of the evidence of guilt presented by the 
State at trial, it is clear that even if appellant had been 
given better representation, there is no likelihood that there 
would have been a different result at the trial. See State 
v. Gray, supra. In the absence of such a showing, appellant 
has failed to establish that he was prejudiced in any way by 
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. He has failed to sustain 
the burden of showing that he was not represented by a com-
petent member of the Bar, willing to represent the interests 
of his client and raise any defenses which were ethically 
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available. The record indicates to the contrary. Thus, under 
the current standard in Utah, appellant was not denied his 
right to the effective assistance of counsel and his convic-
tion and sentence should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF JURORS 
HUNTER AND WIDDISON WAS PROPERLY 
DENIED. 
The failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus 
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove 
the juror has been held to be prejudicial. Crawford v. 
Manning, Utah, 542 P.2d 1091 (1975); State v. Moore, Utah, 562 
P.2d 629 (1977); Jenkins v. Parrish, Utah Case No. 15905, 
March 13, 1981. 
In this case, only juror Hunter was eliminated with a 
peremptory challenge. Defense counsel did not feel that juror 
Widdison exhibited bias that would prejudice his case and he 
used his peremptory challenges for other jurors. By failing 
to eliminate juror Widdison with a peremptory challenge, 
de:endant failed to suffer any harm. It was defense counsel's 
choice to retain Widdison so the defense may not now, on 
ap;:ieal, complain that the juror exhibited prejudicial bias. 
This was a tactical choice by defense counsel, not to be 
second-guessed by other attorneys on appeal. 
Thus, the appellant can only complain of the alleged 
bias of juror Hunter. Respondent submits that Hunter did not 
exhibit sufficient bias to warrant removal for cause. 
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A juror may be challenged for cause if he or she 
exhibits "actual bias." The statute defines actual bias as 
"the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror 
which leads to a just inference in reference to the case that 
he will not act with entire impartiality.". Utah Code Ann. , 
§ 77-30-18(2) (Supp. 1981). 
In State v. Bailey, Utah, 605 P.2d 765 (1980), this 
court applied the following test for impartiality: 
Light impressions which may fairly be 
supposed to yield to the testimony that may be 
offered; which may leave the mind open to a 
fair consideration of that testimony, consti-
tute no sufficient objection to a juror; but 
those strong and deep impressions which will 
close the mind against the testimony that may 
be offered in opposition to them; which will 
combat that testimony and resist its force, do 
constitute a sufficient objection to him. 
605 P.2d at 767. 
Examples of the strong and deep impressions which 
indicate an actual bias include Crawford v. Manning, Utah, 542 
P. 2d 1091 ( 1975), where the prospective juror stated she had 
"strong feelings," and Jenkins v. Parrish, Utah Case No. 
15905, March 13, 1981, where a juror indicated that because of 
her background she would place greater credence in a doctor's 
testimony simply because of his status as a doctor. 
Respondent asserts that there were no such "strong 
feelings" evident that would indicate actual bias on the part 
of juror Hunter. When read in context, her comment that it 
might be better if she didn't hear the case because her son is 
a school principal ( T. 11), is a question to the court as to 
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whether she should be disqualified. Her comment was vol-
unteered at the beginning of voir dire, in response to a ques-
tion whether anyone personally knew either of the attorneys in 
the case. Her comment does not indicate bias or strong 
feelings that would close her mind to any testimony. Her 
intent was clarified when she later said she preferred not to 
hear the case (T. 31). 
Later, when asked if she had formed an opinion in the 
case, she responded that she did not feel that there should be 
any question involved about teacher propriety (T. 29). She 
indicated only that there shouldn't be any question and that 
such questions should be resolved. She had not yet made up 
her mind. If there was any bias, it could reasonably go 
either way based on this comment. She could just as easily 
have been inclined to absolve defendant of any guilt. 
Again, with respect to the juror's acquaintance with 
one of the State's witnesses, no strong feelings showed 
through. When asked if she would "accord him the same tests 
that you would that of another witness as to accuracy and 
truthfulness and things of that nature," she appears to have 
misunderstood whether she should believe the witness. Her 
answer was: My acquaintance is casual. I would believe what 
he said, yes." The court clarified its question by asking: 
"But would you subject him to the same scrutiny as you would 
another witness?" Juror Hunter responded, "probably." In 
addition, that witness's testimony was not crucial. It 
went only to the weather on the day of the crime and was 
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corroborated by other witnesses. Thus, even if she would have 
been inclined to believe his testimony, that alone would not 
have been damaging. These statements went to demonstrating 
her relationships, not to evidencing actual bias. She did not 
indicate any inability to "try this case based on the law and 
the evidence, and not be influenced by any outside influences" 
when asked by the court (T. 31). 
In State v. Bailey, supra, this court recognized that 
there are light impressions which a juror may have which still 
leave the mind open to a fair consideration of the facts. 
These "constitute no sufficient objection to a juror." 605 
P.2d at 767 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court 
has indicated that such light impressions should not dis-
qualify jurors. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). That 
Court stated: 
To hold that the mere existence of any 
preconceived notion as to the guilt or 
innocence of an accused without more, is 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a 
prospective juror's impartiality would be to 
establish an impossible standard. It is 
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court. 
366 U.S. at 723 (emphasis added). 
These standards must control here. No one can be 
expected to have mindless nonperceptions and nonbiases when 
summoned for jury duty. If serious biases exist, they must 
meet the statutory requirements outlined above before a judge 
must remove a prospective juror for cause. These requirements 
have not been met in the present case. There were no "strong 
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and deep impressions" exhibited. The prospective juror had 
"light impressions," but they cannot be grounds for removal 
unless actual bias is shown. Here the juror indicated an 
ability to lay aside those impressions and "render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court." Irv in v. Dowd, 
supra. The voir dire did not evoke any "strong emotional 
response" that requires a challenge for cause. State v. 
Brooks, Utah Case No. 16729, May 28,, 1981 at page 9. 
Respondent further submits that the case of State v. 
Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973), is still bind-
ing law and has not been overruled. The Bautista test, as set 
out in that case, states: 
No claim is made by the defendants that 
by reason of the court's failure to excuse the 
prospective juror they had challenged they 
were compelled to use the preemptory challenge 
they might have used to strike another pro-
spective juror's name from the list. Defend-
ants failed to show that any prejudice 
resulted to them by reason of the court's 
failure to grant their challenge for cause. 
514 P.2d at 532 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure similarly seem to 
require "prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging " be fore a challenge for cause will be 
allowed. Rule 18(e)(l4). 
In State v. Durand, the court noted: 
. our major concern in this, as in 
any case, is with the lawfulness and justice 
of a conviction; and notwithsanding a showing 
of minor impropriety or irregularity, there 
should be no reversal of a conviction unless 
it appears that party has been prejudiced in 
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that in the absence of such impropriety there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
would have been different. 
Utah, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (1977). 
Appellant has shown no such prejudice in this case. 
There is no indication that defense counsel was thereby pre-
vented from exercising a peremptory challenge to eliminate 
another juror who could have been prejudicial to the defense 
case. There is no evidence that any other juror had bias, 
influence on other jurors or prejudice which harmed defendant, 
There has also been no showing that there was any likelihood 
that the verdict would have been different. In the absence of 
such a showing, defendant has failed to suffer harm. 
Even if defense counsel had also exercised a perernp-
tory challenge for juror Widdison, there would be no ground 
for reversal. He indicated only his reading of the newpapers 
(T. 29), and did not exhibit a mind that would, be prevented 
from acting i..'!lpartially. There is also no indication of any 
harm or prejudice from his having served as a jury member. 
Appellant has shown no instances of his bias or prejudice or 
of any influence on the outcome of the trial. There is no 
indication that Widdison actually did hurry up the trial or 
the decision based on his vacation. In short, it seems clear 
that defense counsel did not exercise a peremptory challenge 
for juror Widdison because there was no reason to exclude him 
from the jury. 
An examination of the entire voir dire proceeding 
de:nonstrates that there was insufficient basis on which to 
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challenge the jurors for cause. The court recognized this by 
refusing the challenge saying there was insufficient cause 
( T. 33). This was repeated in the judge's denial of a new 
trial (R. 639). 
The trial judge is given a great deal of discretion in 
conducting voir dire. In the case of Ristaino v. Ross, 424 
U.S. 589 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that: 
Voir dire is conducted under the supervi-
sion ~t~court, and a great deal must, 
of necessity, be left to its sound discretion 
This is so because the determination 
of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such 
an important part, is particularly within the 
province of the trial judge. 
424 U.S. 589, 594. It is clear from the record that Judge 
Gould did not abuse this discretion in determining the im-
partiality of the jurors selected to hear this case. Further, 
as to the denial of appellant's challenge for cause of two 
jurors, it is widely recognized that: 
There are few aspects of a jury trial 
where we would be less inclined to disturb a 
trial judge's exercise of discretion, than in 
ruling on challenges for cause in the empanel-
ing of a jury. 
United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972). 
See also United States v. Gullian, 575 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 
1978), and United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171, 174 (8th 
Cir. 1975). 
The record contains no showing of actual bias. Such a 
finding must be made in the discretion of the trial judge and 
is not to be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discre-
tion. Bambrough v. Bethers, Utah 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (1976). 
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from the 
record, that a juror's intent was different than what the 
trial judge determined. Since appellant has failed to demon-
strate that the trial judge was wrong or that he abused his 
discretion, the trial judge's determination must stand. 
POINT III 
VIEWED IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE VOIR 
DIRE EXAMINATION WAS ADEQUATE TO 
ASSURE APPELLANT OF A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL JURY TRIAL. 
If the voir dire was inadequae, it is the fault of 
defense counsel. Thus, this would be a complaint of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, not of inadequate voir dire. 
Appellant has made no indication that the trial court pre-
vented adequate voir dire, only that it was not realized. 
In Utah State Road Commission v. Marriott, 21 Utah 2d 
238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968). This court noted that "there is 
traditionally given to the trial judge considerable latitude 
of discretion as to manner and form in which he will conduct 
the voir dire examination to determine the qualifications of 
jurors 444 P.2d at 58 (footnote ommitted). See Rule 
47(a) u.R.C.P. Unsubstantial errors will be disregarded. 
Rule 61, U.R.C.P. Other states have emphasized the discretion 
of the trial court in determining the extent of voir dire. 
State v. Rose, 589 P.2d 5, 121 Ariz. 131 (1978); Raullerson v. 
People, 404 P.2d 149, 157 Colo. 462 (1965); State v. Pontier, 
518 P.2d 969, 95 Idaho 707 (1974). See 50 C.J.S. Juries, §§ 
275, et seq. (1947). 
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An examination of the record indicates that the trial 
court made every effort to discover any areas of possible bias 
or prejudice of the jury members that would prevent a fair and 
impartial verdict. Most importantly, the court inquired of 
every juror: 
. And these counsel are now entitled 
to i<:now whether or not any of you have any 
mental reservations about whether or not you 
can accept an oath of office and try this case 
based on the law and the evidence, and not be 
influenced by any outside influences. (T.31). 
The areas of potential bias and competency cited by 
appellant were explored by the court and defense counsel. 
Appellant incorrectly refers to Ms. Austin as juror Austin. 
She was not selected as a juror and did not hear the case. 
Prospective juror Austin had not been assaulted herself, but 
her teenaged daughter had had some problems with her step-
father. These comments were made not to indicate bias, but so 
ti.-.a:: Ms. Austin could disclose everything. the record ind i-
cates that she ~ade every attempt to be fair and open and that 
her experiences wocld have no influence in this case. She 
stated: "I would like to be a juror, and if you feel that I 
am still all right to be a juror, that's fine with me" (T. 26, 
21). She o:::fered tc be excused if the judge felt she would be 
biased. Khen he ex?lained that the purpose of the case was to 
determine whether or not an assault took place and whether the 
defendant r.ad done it, she said she would have "no problem 
with that." She indicated that the family situation had 
n:::it'.Jing to do with her and occurred years ago. She indicated 
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that she could base her decision on the law and the evidence 
and put aside her personal feelings. She said: "I just felt 
that you needed to know that" (T. 26, 27, 31, 32). Defense 
counsel did not feel a need for any further examination of 
juror Austin and declined to ask any more questions of her (T. 
32). Ms. Austin did not even hear the case (R. 583). 
Juror Stockwell had a brother-in-law on the Highway 
Patrol. There is no indication that he had any contacts with 
his brother-in-law or that it might have had any influence on 
the case. The Highway Patrol had no involvement in this case. 
His daughter attended Weber State occasionally, 
not attending Weber that particular quarter (T. 
but she was 
22). While 
the assault occurred at Weber State and was investigated by 
its police department, there is no hint as to why juror 
Stockwell's daughter's prior attendance at Weber was prejudice 
to the appellant. The record contains no indication of how 
this might have resulted in bias or prejudice. Absent that 
showing, there is no reason to now complain about the juror. 
Juror Wood lived in the same neighborhood as Mr. 
Glasmann, the prosecutor. The juror indicated that he did not 
go out with him socially, did not visit in his home, and that 
the prosecutor did not come to his home. He didn't think that 
the prosecutor's participation would make any difference to 
him. Juror Wood stated he had no problem with that (T. 10). 
Defense counsel evidently felt no need to pursue that any 
further. Juror Wood knew of three of the potential State's 
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witnesses. The court followed that up by asking if he would 
scrutinize them equally with the other witnesses without 
giving them any advantage. Juror Wood responded, "I don• t 
think there would be any advantage your Honor" (T. 14). Mr. 
Wood also knew one of the defense witnesses, but that 
acquaintance is not complained of. 
Defense counsel did not pursue examination of these 
relationships, either because he felt no need to do so or 
because he felt a possible advantage in retaining juror Wood. 
There is also no indication that juror Poulter's hear-
ing problem prejudiced appellant. She gave notice of her 
impairment so that defense counsel and others would know they 
would have to speak up. Her apparent failure to hear one 
question, as alleged by appellant was not repeated in the 
course of the trial and thus there is no indication that she 
"could not hear the proceedings." 
p. 15. 
Appellant'~ Brief, at 
Defense counsel at trial evidently felt no need to 
pursue these topics futher. The record shows no indication of 
any biases left unexamined or instances where defense counsel 
ignored possible bias. He likely felt that the possibility of 
antagonizing the jury members, or of revealing information 
that might be prejudicial to his client's case, did not 
justify any further examination of thes areas. 
The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain whether 
there are grounds to challenge for bias and to permit the 
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intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Palmer v. 
State, Ore., 532 P.2d 85 (1975); Jones v. State, Ore., 508 
P.2d 280 (1973); State v. Wilson, 555 P.2d 1375, 16 Wash. App. 
348 (1976); Lopez v. State, Wyo., 544 P.2d 855 (1976). 
Defense counsel fulfilled this purpose. Possible grounds for 
bias were ascertained as evidenced by the attempted challenge 
for cause (T. 32). The record also indicates that defense 
counsel was 
challenges. 
possible bias 
able to intelligently exercise peremptory 
•rhe trial court made every effort to discover 
and defense counsel was able to adequaely 
explore those possible biases. The purposes of voir dire were 
fully met in this case. 
In addition, appellant has pointed to no actual prej-
udice that resulted because of the manner in which the voir 
dire was conducted. Defense counsel did not exercise peremp-
tory challenges for these jurors now complained of. The 
record would seem to indicate, although it is not clear, that 
all the peremptory challenges were not used, and that appel-
lant was not prevented from removing persons he thought would 
be disadvantageous. If defense counsel felt no need to 
exercise a peremptory challenge or to even conduct further 
voir dire examination in those areas, appellant may not, on 
appeal, claim that the voir dire was inadequate. Also, juror 
Austin was not even selected to hear the case. Consequently, 
she could not have harmed appellant. There is also no showing 
of harm by the inclusion of jurors Wood, Stockwell and 
Poulter. 
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The court exercised its discretion in the voir dire 
and concluded it was adequate. To allege otherwise requires 
appellant to show an abuse of discretion of the court -- which 
has not been even alleged in this case. The record shows that 
the areas of possible bias were adequately covered by the 
court and by defense counsel. The purposes of the voir dire 
were fully realized and appellant has suffered no harm as a 
result of the voir dire. 
POINT IV 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPENING STATEMENT 
WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER 
TRIAL TACTICS. 
Appellant alleges that part of defense counsel's open-
ing statement was prejudicial to Mr. Malmrose. Respondent 
asserts that this statement was part of defense counsel's 
trial strategy. The record clearly shows his intent in making 
the statement. Defense counsel stated: "~he only reason that 
:.:r. ~;almrose is be:t:ore you is through a series of coin-
cidences." He then explained the coincioences and continued: 
"J...nd because of these series of coincidences here -- he is not 
here because there is any direct evidence other than the 
witness" (T 45). 
This statement was part of trial strategy not intended 
to prejudice appellant. It was done to make defendant's 
arrest seem only a product of circumstances rather than 
oecause of his guilt of the crime. The fact his car had been 
in that area did not imply involvement in other sexual 
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offenses. The owners of cars parked in that area may have had 
legitimate reasons for being there. The statement was not 
made to risk associating the defendant with any other 
offenses. In fact, there was no mention, at trial, of appel-
lant's prior arrests, and no indication that they jury knew of 
them as a result of defense counsel's statement. The state-
ment was intended, and indeed appears, to be more exculpatory 
than inculpatory. 
As the statement was made by defense counsel, the 
defendant may not now complain of 
complaint could be that it was 
it on appeal. His only 
ineffective assistance of 
counsel. however, this statement seems to be a clear example 
of the trial strategy used by the defense counsel. 
In addition, the opening statement is not considered 
evidence. The jury was instructed not to consider it as such 
(T. 35 R. 583, R. 596). Consequently, the jury members, even 
if they thought the statement was a reference to other crim-
inal conduct, would not have considered it as evidence of any 
such conduct. 
The case of United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 113 (1st 
Cir. 1978), relied on by appellant is not applicable here. 
Here, unlike Bosch, no prior convictions were disclosed and 
there is no indication that the jury knew of, or considered, 
appellant's prior arrests. 
Even if the statement were held to have been a refer-
ence to prior unlawful conduct, it did not deprive appellant 
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of the effective assistance of counsel. In State v. Pierren, 
Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978), in a prosecution for distribution of 
pornography, closing remarks made by defense counsel admitting 
that the material was offensive and lacking in artistic value 
did not deprive the defendants of effective assistance of 
counsel since it was part of defense counsel's trial strategy. 
Thus, the opening statement by defense counsel was not inap-
propriate here. The statement was not prejuedicial and did 
not disclose involvement with any other crimes. It was a 
tactical choice of defense counsel designed for a definite 
purpose. The statement was not considered as evidence by the 
jury. Also, the statement does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Finally, appellant has shown no harm 
resulting from the statement. There is no indication that the 
statement was understood or considered, or that it influenced 
the jury's decision. This statement gives no reapon for dis-
turoing the judgment of the trial court. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO THE 
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFI-
CATION. 
Appellant cont~nds that the trial court erred in 
refusing to admit the expert testimony of Dr. David Dodd. 
Th is court has consistently recognized the discretion of the 
trial court in deciding whether to allow such expert testi-
rnony. This precise question was answered in State v. Griffin, 
u~a~ case No. 16388, February 20, 1981, where this court said: 
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Defendants' assignment of error denying 
their right to compel the attendance of 
witnesses relates to the trial court's refusal 
of an offer to call Dr. Marigold Lintin, a 
psychologist, as an expert witness to testify 
about the credibility of eye-witness identifi-
cation. There should be no question but that 
an accused has the right to have witnesses 
testify in his behalf. But this is usually 
and fairly interpreted as applying to witnes-
ses who have knowledge of the facts about the 
er ime alleged or of facts or circumstances 
which have a direct bearing thereon. 
The calling of expert witnesses to 
testify as to matters which would apply to any 
crime or any trial does not in the true sense 
offer testimony of a witness who has knowledge 
of the facts of the case. Rather it would be 
in the nature of a lecture to the jury as to 
how they should judge the evidence. The 
subject matter of the proffered testimony of 
Dr. Lintin would be to evaluate the cred-
ibility of the state's witnesses in their 
identification of the defendants. The ques-
tion of credibility of the testimony as to the 
identification of the defendants was for the 
jury to determine. Respective counsel were at 
liberty to argue as to the credibility and 
sufficiency of the evidence. There is always 
the possibility of calling expert witnesses to 
testify to various matters relating to the 
trial. This could include the merits of the 
jury system itself, or any of numerous aspects 
thereof. 
Defendants' counsel himself took the 
position which we regard as correct: that 
whether expert testimony should be allowed as 
to the merits of eye-witness identification is 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
Opinion pp. 3-4 (footnotes omitted). See United 
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. 1975). 
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This court has held, as did the trial court, that such 
testimony was within the ordinary intelligence of jurors. As 
such, the testimony may be properly excluded. 
Appellant asserts that the judge did not believe he 
had the discretion to allow the testimony. Respondent submits 
that the judge knew that he had the discretion and exercised 
that discretion in refusing to allow the testimony. He 
stated: • if this type of testimony is to be allowed in 
a trial, it seems to me that we could reach the point then 
where we would be forever hearing experts testify about the 
reliability of testimony of other witnesses" ( T. 169). In his 
Memorandum Decision denying the motion for a new trial, Judge 
Gould reiterated the feelig that: "The calling of an 'expert' 
witness such as Dr. Dodd only amounts to a lecture to the jury 
about how they should perform their duties" (R. 639). The 
jury already knew that it must decide whether to believe the 
witness and how much weight her testimony shoud be accorded 
( R. 598). 
Appellant further asserts that the court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow that testimony. To prove an 
abuse of discretion, a?pellant must establish that no reason-
able person can take the view adopted by the trial court. 
State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 581 P. 2d 812 ( 1978); 
Jankelson v. Cisel, 3 Kash. App. 139, 473 P.2d 202 (1970). 
The record si~~ly cannot support such a claim of abuse 
of discretion. The t::ial judge did not feel the testimony 
1-;ould be helpful (R. 639). He indicated that he was "not 
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personally satisfied that the opinions of Dr. Dodd are of 
sufficient soundness for me to allow them in this trial" 
(T. 169). At the suppression hearing, a different judge 
noted that the witness "pursue[d) the attitude of an advocate 
He continued: "I think he has totally abandoned his 
position as a scientist in this case and is nothing but a per-
son from another discipline hired to argue a case" (T. 108). 
As support for appellant's claim, he states that Judge 
Wahlquist at the suppression hearing believed that the wit-
ness' characteristics enhanced her capacity to perceive and 
recall. The finding of fact complained of by appellant is not 
contrary to the proffered expert testimony. There is no 
evidence that Judge Wahlquist believed that the witness had a 
superior capabilty to recall and there is no indication that 
other jurors believed the same way. In addition, the finding 
of fact was not made available to the jury and would have had 
no influence on them. Even if the jury believed that the 
witness's intelligence made her more capable of later 
identifying appellant -- such a belief is not contrary to Dr. 
Dodd's proferred testimony. He stated that intelligence does 
correlate with accuracy (T. 158). 
Even if such testimony was erroneously excluded, Rule 
5, u.R.E. requires a showing that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bring about a 
different verdict or finding. 
been no such showing. 
In the instant case, there has 
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The proffered expert testimony was properly excluded 
by the trial judge exercising his discretion. The record 
contains no support for a claim of abuse of discretion and 
appellant failed to show that no reasonable person could adopt 
such a view. The finding of fact was not contrary to the 
testimony and did not give rise to a need for such testimony. 
Even if Dr. Dodd' s testimony was erroneously excluded, appel-
lant has made no showing of harm or that its inclusion would 
have had a substantial effect on the verdict. 
POINT VI 
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS'S IDENTIFI-
CATIONS OF DEFENDANT WERE FREE FROM 
TAINT AKD ~~RE PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Appellant asserts that the witness's identifications 
of appellant from the photographs, at trial, and at the hear-
ings were tainted and should have been suppressed. 
It should first be noted that defense counsel failed 
to ooject to any of t:-.e identifications at the trial (T. 72, 
82-84). Rule 4, U.R.E., states that absent evidence that 
tinely objections were made at trial, objections to admission 
of evidence should no~ be considered on appeal. Thus, this 
al:egation of error is not properly before this court. State 
v, Kilson, Utah, 608 P.2d 1237 (1980). 
Should this court decide to consider the merits of 
this allegation, res?Qndent asserts that the trial court did 
not err in admitting t~e identifications. 
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Appellant has not shown that the identification was 
"so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification that he [the defendant] was denied due 
process of law." State v. Jackson, 112 Ariz. 149, 539 P.2d 
906, 911 ( 1975), quoting Stoval v. Denno, 388 u. S. 293, 302 
(1967). By failing to show that the identifications were 
unnecessarily suggestive, appellant has no grounds to seek 
reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
While caution must be observed to see that injustice 
does not result, "peace officers should not be unduly hampered 
in legitimate attempts to investigate crimes and to seek out 
and identify those who have committed them." State v. Perry, 
27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972). While some of the police 
efforts in this case may have been less than perfect, the cir-
cumstances leading up to the idenfications were fair, reason-
able and impartial. State v. Jenkins, Utah 523 P. 2d 1232 
( 19 74). 
The test to be used in evaluating the admissibility of 
identifications was set down in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 
( 197 2). See also Manson v. Braethwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
There, five factors were set down to evaluate the reliability 
of the identification. The identification must be examined 
considering the "totality of the circumstances." Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 
Applying these factors to the present case, it is 
clear that the identifications were not tainted: 
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1. Opportunity to view the criminal. The witness 
testified that appellant was at very close proximity for seven 
and a half or eight minutes (T. 72). The attack took place in 
the daytime with appellant being very close. This was cer-
tainly sufficient opportunity to view appellant. In State v. 
Wilson, Utah, 608 P.2d 1237 (1980), a similar time period was 
held to be sufficient. 
2. Degree of attention. The victim watched appel-
lant' s face and his "whole being" (T. 70). He was very close 
to her during this period, and there was constant physical 
contact be tween the two. There was nothing in the area to 
distract her attention. She does not know what color his eyes 
were, but regularly does not observe the color of eyes (T. 96, 
97). Considering the nature of the crime, the witness was 
able to pay scrupulous attention to the appellant and many 
details about him. The judge noted that she was alert and 
tr.ere were no distracting forces (T. 705, 706). Tlle trial 
judse found that there was good eyewitness identification 
( R. 6 39). 
3. The accuracy of the description. Even though the 
wit~ess was struck, there was no evidence of any unconcious-
ness. She gave a description to police within minutes of her 
attac~. That description was complete and accurate. The only 
"aiscrepancies" complained of by appellant are matters of 
semantics and the words used in the description. The witness 
gave one description to police at that time, with the help of 
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the police. She wrote out another one, the next day, on her 
own. The description included his height, his build, char-
acteristics of his hair, facial features, age, and clothing. 
She testified that her assailant was six feet, three 
inches, to six feet, four inches tall. Appellant is actually 
six feet, one inch tall, without any shoes (T. 364). On that 
day, he had shoes on and was standing slightly higher than her 
on a hill. The two-inch discrepancy is certainly understand-
able in view of appellant's shoes, his standing on a hill and 
the nature of approximations. She testified that he was lean, 
in good shape and appeared to be outdoors a lot. Appellant is 
a school gym teacher. He is outdoors a lot and is lean and in 
good shape as is evident in his pictures (T. 341, 344). She 
described his hair as having body, parted on the right side 
(T. 77). At trial, she indicated that this was mostly due to 
his leaning towards her and his hair fell forward (T. 76, 80). 
Appellant admitted that his hair gets long enough to fall over 
his ears ( T. 364). That would also be long enough for it to 
fall forward while leaning over. 
She also testified that he had lines on his face and 
that the skin fell forward when he leaned forward (T. 93). At 
trial, appellant leaned forward so the jury could see that his 
skin did fall forward revealing lines on his face (T. 364, 
365, 512, 516). She described her assailant as being 45 to 50 
years old. Appellant is 51. She described his apparrel as 
being blue sweat pants. At least one witness recalled seeing 
hL~ in blue sweat pants (T. 261). 
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The description given by the witness describes the 
appellant well. The discrepancies cited by appellant are due 
to the wording involved and the difficulty in verbalizing a 
description. The witness stated that she used the officer's 
words in mentioning the acne (T. 77). 
4. Level of certainty of witness. The witness 
identified appellant in court and said there was no doubt in 
her mind (T. 72). While she examined many photographs, she 
never made an identification until locating appellant's 
picture. She had indicated several photos that looked like 
the assailant but the only actual identification was of appel-
lant. 
tion. 
5. Length of time between the crime and confronta-
The witness identified appellant on July 1, 1981, two 
and a half months after the assault. She then made later 
identifications at the lineup, suppression hearing prelim-
inary hearing and in court. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification certainly satisfies the five criteria of Neil 
v. Biggers, supra. 
Appellant argues that irrespective of reliability, the 
identifications were tainted and should not have been admit-
ted. Respondent submits tht the identifications were all made 
from the witness's observations independent of any suggestive 
influences. This issue was raised at the suppression hearing 
and ruled on there. 
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While there is some dispute as to when the witness 
first identified appellant's picture, such uncertainty is not 
a misidentification, but is a failure to recall when the photo 
lineup occurred. Any discrepancies such as this go only to 
the credibility of the testimony -- not to its competency. 
State v. Long, 29 Utah 2d 177 506 P.2d 1269 (1973). State v. 
Gosby, 85 Wash. 2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975). Here the dis-
crepancies noted by appellant only affect credibility which 
has already been determined by the jury. 
The fact that the exact composition of a group of 
photographs shown to the witness could not be recalled does 
not prevent a determination as to suggestiveness and any 
resulting identification may still be used. State v. 
Volberding, 30 Utah 2d 257, 516 P.2d 359 (1973). In 
Volberding, as here, the pictures used had been returned to 
police files. There was no evidence of negligence nor was 
there a showing of any intentional suppression of evidence 
in order to undermine the rights of the appellant. In 
Vol be rd ing, th is court ruled there was no taint. 
rule should apply in this case. 
The same 
The police officers did make some unfortunate comments 
regarding persons whose pictures were shown to the witness. 
Respondent avers that those comments had no influence on the 
witness and were not sufficient to taint the identifications. 
Even after the comments of the police officers, the 
witness refused to make a positive identification, asking 
instead for a more recent photograph of one, to assure that he 
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was the assailant. The witness is intelligent, with a Masters 
degree in Criminal Justice, and is not likely to be influenced 
by such comments. Comments similar to those made by the 
police officers will taint an identification only if they are 
so "suggestive or persuasive that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that identification was not a genuine product of 
knowledge and recollection of the witness, but was something 
so distorted or tainted that defendant should not be iden-
tified because of fairness." 
492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1972). 
State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 
Examination of the identifications in the case reveals 
no such showing here. There is no reasonable likelihood of an 
identification that was a product of the comments. In Manson 
v. Braethwaite, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that due process does not compel the exclusion of pretrial 
identification evidence obtained by a suggestive ,and unneces-
sary police identi:ication procedure so long as, under the 
totality of the circu~stances, the identification is reliable. 
432 U.S. at 114. Here none of the photos, or men in the line-
up were singled out by the police. Their comments did not go 
towards the identification of any one person. The unfortunate 
comments were directed not at appellant's photograph, but at 
all the photos. 
of appellant. 
Thus, they did not taint the identification 
In State v. Wilson, Utah 608 P. 2d 1237 ( 1980, 
this court, commenting on a similar situation said: 
even if the process helped in identifying defendant, it would 
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not be impermissible unless it could be shown that some 
external, suggestive influence tainted the identification." 
608 P.2d at 1239. 
The yearbook photograph was not suggestive. It was 
shown to the witness only after she asked for a more recent 
photograph of one of the men. It was not shown to her as part 
of a photo lineup and was not suggestive because of its use 
for a limited purpose. 
It should be noted that the identification at the 
lineup was suppressed -- not because of any taint or sugges-
tiveness, but because police officers failed to record the 
proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann., § 77-8-4 (Supp. 
1981) (T. 707). 
There was no taint in the pretrial identifications. 
Judge Wahlquist ruled that the photos were look-alikes as 
required (T. 705). He ruled that they were within the stand-
ards set down by the United States Supreme Court and were 
sufficient (T. 706). He also ruled that the later identifica-
tion at the preliminary hearing was not a product of the 
lineup, but a product of the look-alike characteristics 
(T. 707), and the confrontation at the scene of the crime. 
Since the lineup was suppressed because of the failure 
to make a record and not because of any taint, there was no 
taint which carried over to the in-court identification. The 
encounter with the defendant at the time of the crime provided 
an adequate, independent source on which the witness could 
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base the in-court identification. In State v. Harris, 26 Utah 
2d 365, 489 P.2d 1008 (1971), this court ruled such an in-
court identification admissible when the record showed, as 
here, that the identification was based on observations from a 
source independent of the 
from the lineup or photo 
lineup. Even if there was taint 
identifications, that taint was 
overcome. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
United States v. Wade, relied on by appellant, is 
inapposite. The Wade decision only requires that the state 
prove the lack of taint of an in-court identification if the 
illegal lineup was due to the lack of counsel at the lineup --
not the failure to keep a record. State v. Peyton, 493 P.2d 
1393 (Ore. App. 1972). Here the appellant was not arrested 
until after the lineup and he had no counsel to represent him 
at the lineup. 
Finally, respondent submits that even :i.f there was 
some "suggestiveness," there was no harm from that suggestive-
ness. The photographic identifications were harmless error if 
error at all. The issue is whether the identification 
appreciably affects the jury verdict; what the error might 
have me ant to the jury. Love v. State, Alaska, 457 P.2d 622 
( 1969). Here there is sufficient evidence to sustain the 
con-,'iction without the photographic or pretrial identifica-
tions. 
Appellant failed to object at trial to the identifica-
tions by the witness, and may not now complain on appeal. The 
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identifications were not unnecessarily suggestive and condu-
cive to irreparable misidentification. They were reliable and 
meet all tests required to establish freedom from taint. 
There were no errors that justify reversal. 
POINT VII 
THE LABORATORY REPORT WRITTEN BY 
JAMES GASKILL WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
Respondent submits that the written report in dispute 
was not objected to at trial and was properly admitted. 
Defense counsel failed to object to the introduction of this 
report into evidence. In fact, defense counsel affirmatively 
stated, after examination of the report, that he had no objec-
tion to its introduction (T. 150). Even hearsay is competent 
where no objection is made. Rule 4, U.R.E. 
The reason that defense counsel had no objection is 
because the report was properly admissible into evidence. The 
report merely stated in writing the facts testified to by Mr. 
Gaskill. The report would be admissible under Rule 63(13), 
U.R.E. as a business records entry. This report was made 
during the laboratory examination as part of the normal pro-
cedure, and its circumstances indicate its trustworthiness. 
The failure to object appeared to be a tactical choice 
of the defense attorney. He was offered an opportunity to 
object. He had previously stipulated to Mr. Gaskill's 
qualifications as an expert witness and apparently did not 
feel that making the futile objection would be beneficial. 
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However, even if the report was erroneously admitted 
into evidence, it will be treated as harmless error absent a 
showing that it had substantial influence in bringing about 
the verdict. Rule 4, U.R.E. 
In State v. Echevarrieta, Utah 621 P.2d 709 (1980), 
this court reiterated the following rule: 
That the trial court has considerable 
discretion as to the admissibility of evidence 
and that the erroneous admission of evidence, 
standing alone, is unsufficient to set aside a 
verdict unless it "had a substantial influence 
in bringing about the verdict," see Bambrough 
v. Bethers, Utah, 552 P.2d 1286 (1976). 
621 P.2d at 713 n.11. 
Appellant has made no showing that the admission of 
this evidence, even if erroneous, had a substantial influence 
on the verdict. this report was not, as appellant claims, the 
only physical evidence that had any connection to the defend-
ant. Other physical evidence which was also available to the 
j..Jry included photographs, the police report, the witness's 
own written report, the cotton swab and other items. 
There was no objection at trial and there is no ground 
for objection at this stage of appellant's appeal. 
POINT VIII 
THE QUESTION BY THE PROSECUTOR AS TO 
WHETHER DEFENDANT TOLD POLICE HE WAS 
A VOYEUR WAS NOT A REFERENCE TO 
PRIOR CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT AND THE 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE A CAUTIONARY 
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERROR. 
Appellant relies heavily on, and quotes extensively 
from, united States v. Diaz, 585 F. 2d 116 (5th Cir. 1978) • 
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Respondent asserts that such reliance is misplaced and the 
case is inapplicable. Diaz deals with reference to a prior 
conviction of the defendant for the same offense. Information 
about that prior conviction was elicited by his own defense 
counsel. The prosecutor questioned the defendant further 
concerning the convictions for the limited purpose of showing 
intent and to attack defendant's character which was put in 
issue. Neither counsel requested a limiting instruction by 
the court so the issue on appeal was whether in such a case, 
the trial judge should give such a limiting instruction, sua 
sponte. None of these factors are present in the case at bar. 
Appellant complains tha the judge should have granted defense 
counsel's motion for a cautionary instruction. 
In State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 
(1973), this court stated that counsel are to be afforded wide 
latitude in their arguments to the jury. The Valdez court 
also set forth the test to determine whether a given remark is 
prejudicial: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and 
were they, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks. The determination of whether the 
improper remarks have influenced a verdict is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court 
on motion for a new trial. If there be no 
abuse of this discretion and substantial 
justice appears to have been done, the appel-
late court will not reverse the judgment. 
Id. at 426 (emphasis added). 
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There is no indication that the jurors were influenced 
by the prose cu tor's comment. The lack of prejudice to appel-
iant is demonstrated by the trial judge's refusal to grant a 
new trial. He stated in his Memorandum Decision that at that 
point when the statement was made: "The jury had already been 
instructed that counsel's statements were not evidence. To 
have granted a cautionary admonition would only have drawn 
further attention thereto. Defendant's counsel did not want a 
mistrial order made based on that question" (R. 639). 
It is important to note that it is the responsibility 
of the trial court to determine if improper arguments were 
prejudicial or harmless. The Supreme Court has reiterated 
continuously that they will give great deference to the 
judgment of the trial sourt. In State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 
367, 517 P. 2d 1322 (1974), the prosecutor asked a question 
which was clearly objectionable. Defense counsel moved for a 
:r.ist:!'."ial. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor's conduct 
was not so prejudicial as to violate the defendant's right to 
a fair trial, and denied the motion. The defendant appealed. 
After commenting that, "[the action of the prosecutor] is 
certainly not to be commended," the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that the real issue on appeal was whether to sustain the 
judgment of the trial court. Before affirming the conviction, 
the court said: 
Due to his advantaged position and con-
sistent with his responsibilities as the 
authority in charge of the trial, the inquiry 
is necessarily addressed to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court . Inasmuch as 
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this is his primary responsibility, when he 
has given due consideration and ruled upon the 
matter, this court on review should not upset 
his ruling unless it clearly appears that he 
has abused his discretion. 
30 Utah 2d 367, 369-70. 
Appellant has not alleged, nor shown, that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the cau-
tionary instruction and in refusing to grant a new trial. 
The prosecutor stated that his intent was not to get 
into defendant's past criminal record. He only wanted to 
discuss defendant's character, which was put at issue when the 
defendant took the stand in his own defense. He did not 
intend to mention the prior convictions ( T. 358). The pros-
ecutor certainly did not use this statement as evidence of 
defendant's guilt in this case. 
The trial court, exercising its discretion, refused a 
cautionary instruction. The court did not feel there was 
error sufficient to warrant a new trial. Furthermore, the 
jury was cautioned in its instructions to not consider such 
statements as evidence of fact (R. 599). Respondent asserts 
that the error was not prejudicial and does not warrant a new 
trial. 
POINT IX 
THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF WITNESSES 
TO REBUT DEFENDANT'S ALIBI WAS 
PROPER. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-14-2 (Supp. 1981), provides: 
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Alibi--Notice requirements--Witness 
lists.--(1) A defendant, whether or not 
written demand has been made, who intends to 
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less 
than ten days before trial or at such other 
time as the court may allow file and serve on 
the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, 
of his intention to claim alibi. The notice 
shall contain specific information as to the 
place where the defendant claims to have been 
at the time of the alleged offense and, as 
particularly as is known to the defendant or 
his attorney, the names and addresses of the 
witnesses by whom he proposes to establish 
alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more 
than five days after receipt of the list 
provided herein or at such other time as the 
court may direct, shall file and serve the 
defendant with the addresses, as particularly 
as are known to him, of the witnesses the 
state proposes to offer to contradict or 
impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attor-
ney shall be under a continuing duty to dis-
close the names and addresses of additional 
witnesses which come to the attention of 
either party after filing their alibi witness 
lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attor-
ney fails to comply with the requirements of 
this section, the court may exclude evLdence 
offered to establish or rebut alibi. However, 
the defendant may always testify on his own 
behalf concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, 
waive the requirements of this section. 
Defense counsel failed to disclose the names of all of 
the alibi witnesses before the ten-day peruiod expired. He 
also failed to give notice under subsection two, which imposes 
a "continuing duty to disclose." Now appellant complains that 
t:-ie prosecution failed to give notice of witnesses to rebut 
the alibi. 
Defense cou~sel did not object to the testimony of the 
prose cu ti on• s witnesses because the court had allowed him to 
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use a witness that had not been properly listed (T. 320-324). 
Since defense counsel failed to complain at trial, this issue 
was not preserved for purposes of this appeal. Furthermore, 
appellant cannot complain that the prosecution failed to 
comply with a statute that the appellant himself did not fully 
obey. 
The trial court did not exclude the additional alibi 
witnesses and did not exclude the State's witnesses to rebut 
the alibi. The court did not specifically waive the require-
ments of this statute because it was not made an issue at the 
trial. Had it been made an issue, the court would likely hve 
made the finding of "good cause" and waived the requirements 
of the statute (See T. 320-324). 
Defense counsel justified his noncompliance with the 
statute because the prosecution had been on notice for almost 
four months that an alibi would be established (T. 322). This 
same reason justified the prosecution's failure to give notice 
of the rebuttal witnesses. Defense counsel knew they would be 
called, they were listed at trial as possible witnesses (T. 
13), and then were later introduced. Defense counsel never 
objected to those witnesses because he had notice that they 
would be called. 
Since the defense had made the weather a crucial 
element of the alibi, he could not have been surprised at the 
substance of the testimony of the witnesses. He certainly 
would have known the substance of Mark Eubank's testimony as a 
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rebuttal witness. Having known about these witnesses in 
advance, defense counsel had opportunity to talk to each of 
them prior to trial and he skillfully cross-examined each of 
them. In short, the purposes of the notice state were met 
even though the strict requirements were not followed by 
either side. 
Even if this failure were to constitute error, it is 
harmless error, as the appellant did not suffer any prejudice 
resulting from the failure to strictly comply with the re-
quirements of the statute. The trial judge specifically found 
that there was no harm because "trial counsel had actual 
knowledge well be fore the trial commenced as to who those 
witnesses were and how they woud be used" (R. 640). Appellant 
claims he was prejudiced by the testimony of the witnesses, 
but there is no indication, and he has not shown, that the 
prejudice resulted from the failure to give notice in the 
re~u~red manner rather than from the testimony itself. 
The prosecutio::'s witnesses used to rebut defendant's 
alibi were properly allowed to testify and appellant was not 
prejudiced as a resc1lt. 
POINT X 
THE TESTI~iONY OF THE 
NESS, ~'.A:\K EUBAC-JK, 
ADMITTED. 
STATE Is WIT-
WAS PROPERLY 
Appellant contends that the testimony of Mark Eubank 
~~s hearsay and therefore inadmissible. 
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It should first be observed that appellant has not met 
the requirement that in order to complain of the admission of 
evidence, there must be a clear and definite objection stating 
the grounds therefore. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, Inc., 
20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968); White v. Newman, 10 Utah 
2d 62, 348 P.2d 343 (1960); U.R.E. Rule 4. 
Even if there had been an objection made to Mark 
Eubank's reliance on other person's reports as a basis for his 
opinion, respondent contends that such testimony would still 
be competent under the circumstances. 
Mark Eubank, the expert witness, has testified at many 
trials ( T. 47 5). Defense counsel volunteered to stipulate to 
is expertise ( T. 4 71). Now, however, appellant disputes the 
records relied on by Mr. Eubank in forming his opinion. 
Respondent asserts that the records relied on were 
made in the regular course of business as required by Rule 
63(13), Utah Rules of Evidence. The records included official 
government documents (T. 476), which were sent to Weatherbank, 
reports from State reporting stations (T. 478), 
from the Interrnountain Weather Network (T. 484). 
and reports 
All of these 
records were made in the course of business of the different 
sources, on the day of the assault. These sources and method 
of preparation certainly indicate their trustworthiness. The 
reports are relied on by government agencies, weather report-
ers and a host of private users (T. 474). The documents were 
not made in the regular couse of his business as appellant 
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points out, but they were prepared in the regular course of 
business of each particular entity which prepared them and 
then sent to Weatherbank. 
Judge Gould stated that the testimony "was founded 
upon regular entries made in the course of the business known 
as 'Keather Bank' and are clearly admissible as an exception 
to the hearsay rule" ( R. 640). 
In addition, Mr. Eubank relied on information from his 
personal journal. Appellant relied on information contained 
in a journal for one of its witnesses, yet now contends that 
such a source is inadmissible for the State. Clearly, the 
testimony and the records used in that testimony are admis-
sible under recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Appellant claims that meaningful cross-examination and 
confrontation was impossible. Yet, appellant makes no showing 
o=: why. The record indicates that defense co,unsel cross-
exa~ined Mr. Eubank very forcefully. 
I'he court itself is under no duty, as asserted by 
aI=-pel lant, to enter its own objection to the introduction of 
e,,·idence. Such a duty would arise only if the evidence was 
c:early inadmissible -- which is not the case here. 
Defense counsel failed to object because the testimony 
was clearly admissible. 
0:--. appeal. 
That decision should not be reversed 
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POINT XI 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCON-
DUCT IN THE EXAMINATION OF FLORENCE 
STOWE WHEN SHE WAS CALLED AS A 
REBUTTAL WITNESS. 
The prosecution recalled Mrs. Stowe to the stand to 
determine the dates of journal entries that she had testified 
to earlier. Her journal entry mentioned a party on the day of 
the assault and that entry had helped her recall the day. 
When she was recalled, the prosecution asked: "Does 
it reflect there in that journal? What date have you made 
that entry upon that you have referred to this party?" (The 
party on April 16th). Mrs. Stowe replied: "April the 26th." 
The previous journal entry had been March 30th (T. 470). 
The purpose of this examination was to establish that 
the journal entry was made some ten days after the event she 
described. The prosecutor was not attempting to show that 
Mrs. Stowe was mistaken about the date, only that the entry 
was made later. Defense counsel declined to cross-examine 
her, apparently feeling that there was nothing to clarify. If 
any false impression was created, it should have been correc-
ted by defense counsel. 
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Gould said: "It 
cannot be concluded that the preosecution intended to mislead 
t~e jury." He also commented that "her journal was with her 
a~d at that point of her being recalled, she was available for 
cross-examination by defendant's counsel" (R. 640). 
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The record contains no evidence that a false impres-
sion was created or that it was knowingly fostered by the 
prosecutor. In the absence of these showings, there is no 
prosecutorial misconduct. Respondent submits that there was 
no error in this testimony. 
POINT XII 
THERE WERE NO REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
Appellant appears to complain that the court did not 
give an instruction that he now feels would have been helpful. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that: 
No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, 
stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order 
to avoid a manifest injustice. 
Rule 19(c), Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-19(c) (Supp. 1981). 
Appellant has not charged that a required instruction 
was not given -- only that he thinks an additional instruction 
would have been helpful. Respondent submits that the instruc-
tion stated by appellant is improper for this case. First, 
that instruction is not required in this State. All of the 
cases cited by appellant are from other jurisdictions. He has 
shown no instance where a similar instruction has been given 
or required in this State. Second, the instruction is inap-
plicable because the eyewitness identification was not the 
sole basis for conviction in this case. Appellant was 
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convicted due to the identification, the laboratory tests, and 
the rebuttal of defendant's alibi. Third, the essence of the 
requested instruction was contained in jury instruction six 
(R. 598). This instruction was given to the jury emphasizing 
the need to weigh the identification. Fourth, appellant has 
not shown how manifest injustice resulted from the absence of 
the instruction. There is no showing of jury prejudice, 
misinterpretation of the instructions or ignorance of their 
duties as jurors. There is no showing of manifest injustice 
to allow consideration of this alleged error, since there was 
no objection at trial. 
Appellant claims error because the jury instructions 
were not reread at the close of the case. There is no evi-
dence of any prejudice resulting from the failure to reread 
those instructions. In fact, the written instructions were 
available to the jury -- to take into their deliberations 
( T. 5 04). The trial :udge properly exercised his discretion 
in declining to reread the first eleven instructions. 
The trial judge, in his Memorandum Decision, stated 
tha':: such a cautionary instruction, especially sua sponte, 
wou2-d have been an irr:proper comment on the evidence ( R. 640). 
Even if the i~struction had been given, there is no indication 
that it would have made any difference in the verdict or that 
it would have had any influence on the jurors. 
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POINT XIII 
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
INTRODUCE RESULTS OF POLYGRAPH TEST 
IS NOT EVIDENCE OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The results of defendant's polygraph test were not 
introduced into evidence at trial because they had been 
declared inadmissible at the Suppress ion Hearing (Supp. Hear-
i ng 4 3) • The judge declared that the tests had not been 
properly conducted. 
Even if they had been properly conducted, the results 
would still not be admissible at trial. In State v. Collins, 
Utah, 612 P.2d 775 (1980), this court stated: "A vast major-
i ty of courts which have ruled on the issue, however, hold 
unstipulated polygraph examinations inadmissible." 612 P.2d 
at 778. See State v. Abel, Utah 600 P.2d 994 (1979); State v. 
Jenkins, Utah 523 P.2d 1232 (1974). 
Appellant claims that defense counsel should have 
je·:eloped an adequate evidentiary record to allow the use of 
the polygraph test under the guidelines of Collins, supra. 
Appellant reads Collins erroneously, however. Collins does 
not state that polygraph results would be considered if there 
~as an adequate evidentiary record. The court said: 
it is impossible to address the issue of the admissibility 
of polygraph results without an adequate evidentiary record 
612 P. 2d at 77 8. Even with such a record, there is 
no indication that the results would have been considered. 
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If appellant claims that the results were erroneously 
excluded, he must prove an abuse of discretion by Judge 
Wahlquist at the Suppression Hearing. This he has failed to 
do. If he claims that defense counsel erred in not developing 
an adequate record, he is complaining that defense counsel did 
not expend his efforts gathering information that has not been 
allowed as evidence. See Collins, supra. Defense counsel 
decided to not use the results because it was prohibited at 
the Suppression Hearing, likely would not have been admis-
sible, and would have allowed the prosecution to use the 
results of its polygraph test. 
Respondent submits that the failure to introduce the 
polygraph results is not evidence of the ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction should be affirmed because no 
reversible errors occurred at trial. Any improprieties which 
may have occurred did not have a substantial adverse effect on 
the defendant. The trial was conducted fairly and within the 
limits required by law, and appellant suffered no prejudice 
which justifies or requires a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this -:.,;() day of July, 1981. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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